Live wires: Saddam's Iraq was a real threat

Picture high-voltage lines, somehow cut so the ends are exposed. Then picture a second bunch of lines from a separate power source, also cut and lying intermingled with the first set. There’s humming and sparking, but no ends have touched yet. Keep that image in your mind.

It has almost become conventional wisdom that Saddam’s dictatorship posed no real threat. True, chemical munitions dumps or other WMD “stockpiles” weren’t found. True, the intelligence community made erroneous assumptions. I’ll even stipulate that the administration exaggerated some of the intelligence. But the threat was there.

The former UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus (and far more experienced than Hans Blix) says this of Iraq’s WMD:

“The search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions . . . distort[ed] the important question of WMD in Iraq. . . [The real threat was] the combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques and testing.”

And this from David Kay, who’s “we were all wrong” quote (regarding stockpiles) is frequently cited, while his bottom-line judgment is rarely mentioned:

“I actually think [Iraq] may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought. . . the likelihood [of] a seller and a buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we assessed. . . that probably was a risk that--if we did avoid--we barely avoided.”

And what about the much-debated Iraq-al-Qaida connection? Despite clever wording by staff and members of the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee, there plainly was a longstanding and continuing relationship (i.e. many contacts) between Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaida right up until the war. You can mince around with phrases like “no established formal relationship”, but that’s just quibbling. There is a whole body of reporting, available in open sources and declassified intelligence products, that reveals Iraq’s prewar contacts/relationships with Osama bin Laden’s network.

Here are three examples that are generally accepted--even by those now chanting the “no collaborative relationship” line.

In 1998, in response to al-Qaida bombings of two American embassies, the Clinton administration struck the al-Shifa chemical plant in Sudan with cruise missiles. Clinton and his team strongly maintained then (and still maintain) that the strike on Sudan was justified because of Iraqi-Sudan-al-Qaida links. Sandy Berger, Clinton's national security adviser said there was "physical evidence indicating that al Shifa was the site of chemical weapons activity," that “Iraq has assisted chemical weapons activity in Sudan" and cited "information linking bin Laden to the Sudanese regime and to the al Shifa plant." His counterterrorism expert, Richard Clarke, emphatically concurred.

In 2002, the now-former CIA Director, George Tenet, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that “There is evidence that Iraq provided al-Qaida with various kinds of training--combat, bomb-making and (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) CBRN.” Although he resigned under a cloud, Tenet never backed off this statement. The Senate Intelligence Committee essentially backed him up, citing "twelve reports. . . that pointed to Iraq or Iraqi national involvement in al-Qaida's chemical/biological weapons efforts." These reports were not conclusive--but were not dismissed either.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report clarifies evidence that al-Qaida-associated terrorist Zarqawi was in Baghdad before the war, that the regime was aware of his presence and activities--and may well have acquiesced. Zarqawi’s involvement in terrorist plots involving chemicals and toxins has been widely reported, both in press and intelligence channels. According to the Senate report, “HUMINT reporting indicated that the Iraqi regime certainly knew that al-Zarqawi’s was in Baghdad because a foreign service gave that information to Iraq.” Although partially blacked-out, the declassified portion also says, “. . . al-Zarqawi and his network were operating both in Baghdad and in the Kurdish-controlled region of Iraq”.

At the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center--the entity primarily responsible for analyzing and countering the terrorist threat--this kind of reporting certainly raised concern. Buried in the Senate Intelligence Committee report is an underreported gem regarding the CTC’s approach to connections between Iraq and al-Qaida. Their assumption is that “any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States.”

Remember those exposed, live power lines? Now imagine you’re the fire safety inspector. See any threat? Today’s news headlines virtually scream, “War was unjustified” and “There was no threat”. Horse pucky! The combination of Saddam’s WMD aspirations and programs, and Iraq’s multiple ties/links/connections to terrorist killers bent on mass murder of Americans did indeed pose a threat that demanded decisive action.

T.T.