Antics with semantics: Commission plays games with Iraq-al-Qaida relationship

President Bush’ critics bitterly accuse him and his administration of miscasting the intelligence about the prewar threat posed by Saddam’s dictatorship and the extent of its ties to al-Qaida. Yet the critics--including some members of the 9/11 Commission--are hardly above exploiting the vagaries of language themselves in order to damage Bush politically. Semantic games have crept into the Commission’s latest Staff Statements, which infer that there was no “collaborative relationship” between Iraq and al-Qaida.

The mainstream media immediately took up the cudgel, emblazoning headlines with “No Saddam-al-Qaida Relationship”. They know that to assert this is to strike at the very heart of the Bush rationale for going to war in Iraq.

But the Commission did not say there was never an Iraq-al-Qaida relationship and in fact acknowledged that Bin Laden met with Iraqi intelligence in the late 1990s. Moreover, the words the staff writers used to downplay any ties deserve a close parsing to see what they really say--or don’t say. Here are the relevant citations from Statement No. 15, along with my comments. To see all the Commission’s Staff Statements, see www.9-11commission.gov.

“Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime.” [This essentially discredits the shopworn argument that Osama and his holy warriors wouldn’t cooperate with an un-Islamic tyrant like Saddam.]

“A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded.” [To say that Iraq “apparently” didn’t respond is really saying we just don’t know if, or how, the Iraqis responded.]

“There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida also occurred after Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. . .” [The shallowness of this is breathtaking. These 18 words brush aside a whole body of work that investigative journalists like Stephen Hayes, Andrew McCarthy, Ed Epstein, Jeff Goldberg and others have compiled detailing many reports of Iraqi-al-Qaida dealings.]

“. . . but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship.” [The words “collaborative relationship” are the key phrase, but again they’re preceded by “they do not appear to have resulted. . .” This also begs the serious question of what is meant by “collaborative”? What should we call senior level contacts, discussions of safe haven, al-Qaida members in Baghdad, and Iraqi training to al-Qaida members on poisons, gas, and bombs? That is how George Tenet characterized Iraq’s links to al-Qaida in his 2002 letter to Congress, and he hasn’t retracted a word of it. Would such a relationship qualify as collaboration, cooperation, or mere contacts?]

“Two senior Bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaida and Iraq.” [Oh come on. We’re supposed to take at face value the denials of fanatical killers who operated covertly to run an extremely secretive terrorist network?]

And there’s this, which says much less than it appears to.

“We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaida cooperated on attacks against the United States.” [First, what constitutes “credible evidence”? What about the evidence that was not found “credible”? Why didn’t it qualify? Did they differentiate between “evidence” and “reporting”? Second--and probably most important--the final part of the sentence limits its applicability to Iraqi cooperation “on attacks against the United States”. What about Iraqi-al-Qaida cooperation in other areas besides direct attacks on the U.S.?]

Most telling of all, the Commission statements--richly detailed in so many other regards--are laughably scant when it comes to this key subject. The woefully incomplete, almost casual treatment of alleged Iraq-al-Qaida ties, and of the reports that lie behind the allegations, is a great disservice. I’ve been hoping that partisan politics wouldn’t entirely taint the Commission’s judgments, but that hope was in vain.

T.T.

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