To vote or not to vote? Democracy and the Ayatollah

Power doesn’t always flow from the barrel of a gun. For many of the 15 million Shiites in Iraq, power flows from the mouth of a 73-year old man, who rarely leaves his small, sparsely furnished apartment. The Grand Ayotallah Ali al-Sistani has emerged as the most influencial cleric in Iraq--and just possibly the most important man in the country.

To call the Ayatollah the “Shiite Pope” is a bit of a stretch, but it does reflect the nature and scope of his power, and the way he has chosen to wield it so far. Born in Iran, it is said he began memorizing the Koran by age 5. In 1952 he migrated to Iraq as a young man to live and study in Najaf, the traditional spiritual center of Shiite Muslims. There he has lived a quiet, monastic life, dedicated to studying and interpreting the Koran and the rulings of other clerics--especially those of Grand Ayatollah Khoei. When Khoei died In 1992, Sistani was selected by his peers to replace him.

Placed under house arrest in 1994 by Saddam’s Ba’athists, Sistani has lived largely in physical isolation for a decade. His non-descript house at the end of a winding alley in Najaf lies in the shadow of the great Holy Shrine of Ali. Those who have been inside to meet with him describe Sistani’s residentce as humble, with only pillows and rugs in the office where he meets visitors.

But the spartan surroundings are deceptive. Sistani and his aides run a foundation which controls millions of dollars. Faithful Shiites donate 20% of their income, and according to some reports, Sistani’s organization pays out $5 million a month just to support students and teachers. To millions of his followers, his words concerning personal as well as political practices are viewed as inspired, if not divine, guidance. “Ayatollah Sistani has the last word. He is above any president, and his words are above the law”, says another Shiite religious leader.

It is this kind of power of which explains Ayatollah Sistani’s pivotal place in deciding the future path Iraq will take--towards a participatory democracy; towards a Shiite-led theocracy, or towards chaos, civil war and bloodshed.

In political matters, Sistani follows the “quietist” tradition of his predecessor and mentor, Grand Ayatollah Khoei. Clerics are to be active in promoting Islamic principles in public life, but are discouraged from actually taking political power themselves. To Sistani, the mullahs of Iran’s theocracy have departed from correct teachings. His apolitical stance has mostly been good news for the U.S.-led coalition, the Central Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as they have tried to secure and rebuild the country.

In December, however, the Grand Ayatollah threw a curve ball by issuing a decree that the U.S. plan for holding caucuses--in place of direct elections--was unacceptable. The caucus plan was initially seen by Coalition officials as the only practical way of turning over political authority to a soveriegn Iraqi government in the near term. But Sistani and allied Shiite clerics are demanding that direct, popular elections be held before June 30 (the self-imposed deadline the Bush administration has set for turning over power). In January, they staged mass demonstrations to punctuate their demand.

It was this “show of force” that pursuaded Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, to humbly ask the U.N. to re-enter the equation. In recent weeks, Sistani has ended the protests and indicated that if the U.N. recommended that safe, fair elections were not possible by June 30, he would listen to an alternative. There is still a chance, then, that the U.N. can broker some kind of agreement that will avoid a Coalition-Shiite confrontation.

But the marker has been laid down. It is now evident that the Iraqi Shiites--led by Sistani--will not be content with a power-sharing arrangement that keeps them from exercising the weight of their majority. And that may not be such a bad thing. The Islam preached by Sistani is fundamentalist in nature, but is not the radical anti-western flavor of Ayatollah Khomenei and his successors in Iran.

The long-term worry for the U.S. is that an election win by the Shiite majority might lead to a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy, less radical than Iran, but still a far cry from the open, western-style democracy that could help transform the Middle East. We may not have a choice, however. This may well be the moment for Paul Bremer and the Bush administration to see the writing on the wall and embrace the call for popular elections in Iraq.

T.T.

©2004, WestRim Digital Arts